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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Due to the automatic waiver provision in I.C. § 20-509, seventeen-year-old 
Daniel Jensen was prosecuted as an adult for attempted first degree murder. He 
entered a conditional guilty plea to a reduced charge, reserving his right to appeal the 
district court’s denial of his motion to declare I.C. § 20-509 unconstitutional and his 
motion to suppress evidence. Mr. Jensen challenged both rulings on appeal. (App. 
Br., pp.5–28.) In response to Mr. Jensen’s challenge to I.C. § 20-509, the State argues 
the automatic waiver provision was neither “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment 
nor a denial of due process. (Respt. Br., pp.6–16.) The State’s arguments are 
misguided and unpersuasive. The automatic waiver provision imposes cruel and 
unusual punishment on juvenile defendants, and it violates their due process rights. 
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Jensen’s Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–3.) They are not repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Jensen’s motion to declare automatic 
waiver provision of a juvenile into adult court unconstitutional?  
 








The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Jensen’s Motion To Declare The Automatic 




 The State takes issue with both of Mr. Jensen’s constitutional challenges to 
Idaho’s automatic waiver provision, I.C. § 20-509. This statute mandates the transfer of 
juvenile defendants (age fourteen to eighteen) accused of certain crimes into adult 
court—with no regard to the juvenile’s individual characteristics or the circumstances of 
the alleged offense and no mechanism to transfer the juvenile back to juvenile 
jurisdiction (“JCA jurisdiction”). As argued in Mr. Jensen’s Appellant’s Brief, I.C. § 20-
509 violates the Eighth Amendment as well as due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. (See App. Br., pp.5–19.) This Reply Brief responds to, and refutes, the 
State’s arguments. 
  
B. Idaho’s Automatic Waiver Provision Violates The Eighth Amendment 
 The State presents three arguments in opposition to Mr. Jensen’s contention that 
I.C. § 20-509 violates the Eighth Amendment. The State’s first argument does not 
address the merits of Mr. Jensen’s position, but rather claims that Mr. Jensen waived 
the issue. (Respt. Br., pp.7–8.) Specifically, the State alleges that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual “punishment,” and since Mr. Jensen failed to 
cite any legal authority that I.C. § 20-509 is “punishment,” his argument is waived 
pursuant to State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259 (1996) (appellant waives an issue not 
supported by argument and authority). This allegation is belied by Mr. Jensen’s 
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Appellant’s Brief. (See App. Br., pp.5–14 (citing to the United States Supreme Court, 
Idaho appellate courts, two cases from other jurisdictions, and secondary authorities).) 
Simply put, Mr. Jensen argued for the good faith extension or modification of existing 
case law to a certain statute. This type of argument is an incontrovertible pillar of 
appellate law. New case law is developed through this practice. If the State’s position 
prevails, no future case law could be created because any argument to change or 
expand the existing law would be met with an objection that it is not supported by a 
citation to authority directly on point. This position essentially eliminates the role of the 
appellate courts with respect to questions of law. Indeed, the seminal case on judicial 
review, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), would not exist under the State’s vision 
of appellate review. Mr. Jensen asserts that he provided ample authority for his 
argument and thus respectfully requests that this Court consider the merits of this issue 
on appeal.  
 Second, turning to the merits of Mr. Jensen’s argument, the State claims that 
I.C. § 20-509 does not constitute “punishment” under Eighth Amendment. (Respt. 
Br., pp.8–10.) The State’s reasoning is “overly simplistic, and evaluates form over 
substance.” People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 557 (Ill. 2014) (Theis, J., dissenting). 
The Eighth Amendment “proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments. The 
Amendment embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 
humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against which we must evaluate penal measures.” 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. 
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). “Determination of whether [a] statute is a 
penal law requires careful consideration,” not simply an “inspection of the labels pasted 
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on them.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958). Thus, the purpose, not the label, of a 
statute determines whether it is penal. Id. at 96.  
 Here, the purpose of I.C. § 20-509 is to allow for harsher adult penalties for 
juveniles. The automatic waiver provision operates by  
mandatorily placing juveniles in criminal court based only on their 
offenses, and thereby exposing them to vastly higher adult sentences and, 
in effect, punishing them. “[T]he true impact and frequently articulated goal 
of transfer proceedings” is “to subject the juvenile offender to the harsher 
sentencing scheme only available in the adult justice system.” 
 
Patterson, 25 N.E.3d at 557 (Theis, J., dissenting) (quoting Jenny E. Carroll, Rethinking 
the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of Juvenile Transfer Hearings: Apprendi, Adult 
Punishment, and Adult Process, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 180–81 (2009)). In fact, this 
Court plainly articulated this goal in State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654 (1999): 
By giving the sentencing judge the power to sentence a juvenile 
automatically waived into adult jurisdiction as a juvenile, the underlying 
assumption of the statute is that the judge has the power to, in every 
respect, sentence the juvenile as an adult. . . . Sentencing as a juvenile, 
once the juvenile is under adult jurisdiction, is the exception, not the norm. 
 
Id. at 659 (emphasis added). Moreover, this Court held in State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141 (1991), that the district court is prohibited from giving any “special 
consideration” to the unique characteristics of a juvenile defendant once the juvenile is 
designated an “adult” for sentencing. Id. at 146, overruled on other grounds in State v. 
Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 (1992). Thus, “[w]hile the language of the transfer statute 
itself may not impose a punishment,” I.C. § 20-509 is “indisputably penal in nature” and 
“subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Katherine I. Puzone, An Eighth Amendment 
Analysis of Statutes Allowing or Mandating Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult 
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Criminal Court in Light of the Supreme Court’s Recent Jurisprudence Recognizing 
Developmental Neuroscience, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 52, 84 (2015).  
 I.C. § 20-509 removes “youth from the balance” and imposes Idaho’s “most 
severe penalties on juvenile offenders . . . as though they were not children.” Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012). “This is inconsistent with the 
Eighth Amendment.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010). “[A]n offender’s age is 
relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take 
defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Id. The mandatory and 
inflexible nature of the automatic waiver provision is flawed for this very reason. This 
Court should declare it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 
 The State’s third and final argument against Mr. Jensen’s challenge to I.C. § 20-
509 is that, again, Mr. Jensen presented no authority for the “notion” that the district 
court was permitted to sentence him without consideration of his “youth and attendant 
characteristics.” (Respt. Br., pp.10–11.) As discussed above, Broadhead and Burnight 
stand for this precise “notion.” (See App. Br., pp.12–14.) The automatic waiver provision 
exists for district courts to impose adult penalties on juveniles without any limitation, 
such as the juvenile’s youth and attendant characteristics. Broadhead, 120 Idaho at 
146; Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659; State v. Moore, 127 Idaho 780, 784–85 (Ct. App. 
1995). The State’s assertion that Mr. Jensen failed to present authority to preserve this 
argument is baseless. 
 Moreover, to the extent that the State argues Mr. Jensen was afforded 
consideration of his “youth and attendant circumstances,” (see Respt. Br., pp.10–11), 
that argument is beside the point. Whether Mr. Jensen was afforded “special 
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consideration” of his juvenile characteristics at sentencing does not insulate the 
automatic waiver provision from constitutional challenges. “The constitutional infirmity 
with the statute is not that it exposes juveniles to adult sentences, but that it operates 
automatically for those juveniles charged with certain offenses.” Patterson, 25 N.E.3d at 
587 (Theis, J., dissenting). In short, the Eighth Amendment violation is the automatic 
transfer, not the sentencing. The State also seems to argue that any constitutional 
violation was harmless for the same reason—the district court considered Mr. Jensen’s 
juvenile characteristics because it imposed a “blended sentence.” (Respt. Br., pp.10–11; 
see also R., pp.197–203); see I.C. §§ 19-2601A, 20-509(4)(b). That, too, is beside the 
point. If Mr. Jensen were not automatically transferred to adult jurisdiction, he may have 
remained in JCA jurisdiction where a blended sentence is not even an option. I.C. § 20-
520(1) (juvenile sentencing options). At the very least, without the automatic transfer, 
the district court would have had the discretion to determine if it was appropriate to 
transfer Mr. Jensen to adult jurisdiction. I.C. § 20-508 (discretionary waiver after a full 
investigation, notice, and hearing). Thus, the constitutional violation is not harmless. 
The automatic waiver provision did not merely contribute to the sentence imposed; it set 
the foundation for the entire criminal process. 
   
C. Idaho’s Automatic Waiver Provision Violates The Due Process Clause 
 The State asserts that Mr. Jensen’s arguments do not warrant the reexamination 
of State v. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454 (Ct. App. 1985), and its progeny, which repeatedly 
held that I.C. § 20-509 does not violate the due process rights of juvenile defendants. 
(Respt. Br., pp.12–16.) As noted by the State, the rule of stare decisis dictates that the 
Court follow controlling precedent “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven 
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over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 
787, 789 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660 (2000)). 
Mr. Jensen submits that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper,1 
Graham, and Miller prove that Anderson and its progeny have become unjust and 
unwise over time. The Court of Appeals last reviewed whether I.C. § 20-509 comports 
with the due process clause in 1995,2 well before the United States Supreme Court 
issued Roper (2005), Graham (2010), and Miller (2012). The most recent case 
regarding juvenile defendants, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), 
solidifies the United States Supreme Court’s view that “children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 733. To this end, Montgomery 
held that “Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law.” Montgomery, 136 
S. Ct. at 734. In light of drastic evolution of the treatment of juveniles in the criminal 
justice system, Mr. Jensen contends that Anderson and its progeny also must evolve. 
The Court should reexamine the constitutionality of I.C. § 20-509 and hold that it 
violates the due process rights of juvenile defendants.  
 As argued in Mr. Jensen’s Appellant’s Brief, I.C. § 20-509 violates the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives juveniles of their 
liberty interest in JCA jurisdiction without any procedural safeguards before the transfer 
to adult court or safety mechanisms to return to JCA jurisdiction. (App. Br., pp.16–18.) 
In light of Roper, Graham, and Miller, all juvenile defendants are entitled to the 
“advantaged position” provided by JCA jurisdiction. Anderson, 108 Idaho at 458. 
                                            
1 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Further, I.C. § 20-509 bears no rational relationship to the legislative purpose because, 
except for the “rare juvenile offender,” there are no penological justifications for 
subjecting juveniles to harsh adult penalties. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; see also 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34. (See App. Br., pp.18–19.) 
  
II. 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Jensen’s Motion To Suppress 
 Mr. Jensen respectfully refers the Court to his arguments in his Appellant’s Brief 
on the issue of whether the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 
statements made during a police interview at his home and an interrogation in jail after 
his arrest. (See App. Br., pp.19–28.) He maintains that he was subject to a custodial 
interrogation without the requisite Miranda3 warnings during the home interview. (App. 
Br., pp.20–25.) Likewise, he continues to assert that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently waive his Miranda rights during the jail interrogation. (App. Br., pp.20–
21, 25–28.) Due to these violations of his right against self-incrimination, Mr. Jensen 
contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.  
                                                                                                                                            
2 State v. Espinoza, 127 Idaho 194 (Ct. App. 1995). 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Jensen respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
denying his motion to declare I.C. § 20-509 unconstitutional and vacate his judgment of 
conviction. In the alternative, Mr. Jensen requests that this Court reverse the district 
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and 
remand this case for further proceedings  
 DATED this 5th day of July, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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